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Abstract
In this paper, we propose a matching and search model with adjustment costs in the form
of labor disruption charges that can generate counter-cyclical real wages. Empirically, we
use a measure of wage cyclicality based on the generalized impulse response function of real
wages to a shock in a cycle measure. We provide evidence that wages in the United States
are counter-cyclical during the first few quarters. The calibration and simulated results of
the model match remarkably well the counter-cyclicality obtained from our empirical model.
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1 Introduction
The study of the cyclicality of real wages is at the heart of macroeconomic theory for many
reasons. Indeed, not only wage cyclicality has important implications for understanding the
function of labour markets (see, for example, Pissarides (2009)) but also it is crucial for the va-
lidity of competing business cycle theories in opposition to a keynessian functioning of the labour
market (Abraham and Haltiwanger (1995)). According the the theoretical assumptions retained,
real wages are found to be counter-cyclical under sticky wages but procyclical under sticky prices.
More precisely, Keynesian models with sticky nominal wages that predict counter-cyclical real
wages have been criticized and rejected in favor of Real Business Cycle (RBC) or New Keyne-
sian (NK) models that, based on price stickiness and imperfect competition, yield pro-cyclical
wages.1 However, given the inability of the previous models to be plausibly reconciled with
observed data in many cases, a common view is that having both pricing and wage decisions
staggered can generate procyclical, acyclical, or countercyclical real wages (e.g., Barro and Gross-
man (1971), Blanchard (1986) and Huang, et al. (2004)).
In this paper, we contribute to this wide debate by studying the impact of adjustment costs on
real wages cyclicality. In particular, we develop a model with matching and search frictions and
adjustment costs generated by labor disruption. These costs represent the forgone output due to
the interruption in the production process while hiring and firing workers. More in detail, incum-
bent employees spend part of their working time training new hired workers and it takes some
time before the new hired workers start to produce an become fully productive. Additionally,
incumbent workers need to be reallocated to the job positions of the workers who are separated
from the firm.2
From an empirical point we provide a description of the cyclical behaviour of quarterly real wages
in the United States for the 1960-2011 period. To this end, we adopt a dynamic approach and
propose a precise measure of wage cyclicality based on the generalized impulse response function
(GIRF) derived from a VAR model. Note that the GIRF, suggested by Koop et al., has the
enviable advantage of not requiring the orthogonalization of the innovations. As such, it does
not depend of the ordering of the variables in the model.
We calibrate and simulate the model for the USA. We consider the incidence of linear and
quadratic adjustment costs as well as the possibility that labor disruption costs operate immedi-
ately or with one period lag, capturing the idea that reorganizing the production process takes
some time. We show that in the presence of labor disruption costs, firms translate part of them
to the workers’ wage, reducing their implicit bargaining power and, depending on the structure
of these costs, generating a reduction in wages in response to a positive shock in the output-gap.
1See Abraham and Haltiwanger (1995) for a discussion of alternative hypotheses concerning the cyclicality of
real wages.
2Along this line, Russell Cooper (2009) estimated that plants lose 3% of their revenues as consequence of the
presence of labor disruption costs.
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The presence of a countercyclical behavior in the worker’s bargaining power with matching
frictions is also present in Rotemberg (2008) and Abbritti and Fahr (2011). In the first case,
fluctuations in market power are due to fluctuations in the elasticity of demand facing the typical
firm. In turn, Abbritti and Fahr (2011) introduce wage adjustment costs in a New-Keynesian
DSGE model. These costs are present in the intermediate goods sector and are modeled by a con-
vex function with lower costs for adjusting wages upwards than downward. The need to bargain
wages leads to a situation where the adjustment cost is partly transferred to the employee through
wage negotiations, generating a countercyclical response in the worker’s bargaining power.
Both the GIRF for the USA and the simulated impulse-response functions from our model pro-
vide similar results: real wages fall immediately after a positive shock in the output gap. After a
few quarters, they display an inverted hump-shaped pattern. The model also shows the presence
of wage rigidity when these costs are linear and there is no lag adjustment. In this case, the pos-
itive effect of the increase in the output gap is canceled out by the negative effect that operates
throughout the reduction in the implicity worker’s bargaining power. Summing-up, adjustment
costs in the form of labor disruption charges can generate counter-cyclical real wages -when these
costs are quadratic- or acyclicality- when they are linear-.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present a matching and search
model with labor disruption costs. Section 3 describes the empirical methodology and the data
set. Section 4 and we provide the empirical results and the calibration for the US economy.
Finally, we conclude in section 5.
2 Theoretical model
In this section we present a model that has the main objective to analyze the impact of output
shocks on the cyclical behavior of wages under the presence of labor disruption costs and match-
ing frictions. The labor market consists of a continuum of risk-neutral, infinitely-lived workers
and large firms.3 Workers and firms discount future payoffs at a common rate β. Furthermore,
capital markets are perfect and time is discrete.
Workers may be either unemployed or employed. Unemployed individuals enjoy an instantaneous
utility b each period. Those who are employed earn a wage wt. Each period a constant proportion
λ of workers are exogenously separated from the firm. Thus, when an employment relationship
is broken, the worker becomes unemployed. Search frictions in the labor market are captured
by a constant-returns-to-scale matching function m(ut, vt), where ut denotes the unemployment
rate and vt is the vacancy rate in period t. We follow den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2000) and
assume the following matching function:
m(ut, vt) =
utvt
(uϕt + v
ϕ
t )
1/ϕ
, ϕ > 0. (1)
This matching function implies that the higher the number of vacancies with respect to the
3We normalize the measure of workers to 1.
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number of unemployed workers, the easier to find a job and the more difficult to fill up vacancies.
Unemployed workers find jobs at the rate f(θt) = m(ut, vt)/ut, and vacancies are filled at the rate
q(θt) = m(ut, vt)/vt,where θt = vt/ut denotes labor market tightness. Employment, nt evolves
according to the following dynamics:
nt = (1− λ)nt−1 + q(θt)vt. (2)
Then, by the normalization of the labor force, unemployment is equal to ut = 1− nt.
2.1 The representative firm
Each firm consists of a number of jobs which are either filled or vacant. Labor is the only factor of
production and firms’ technologies exhibit constant returns to scale. The output in each firm is
given by yt = Atnt where At is the productivity level common to all firms. The production costs
consist of the wage cost, wt, the constant cost of posting vacancies, c, and the labor adjustment
costs ξt. These last costs capture the forgone output due to the interruption in the production
process while hiring and firing workers. For example, incumbent employees spend time training
new hired workers and it takes some time before the new hired workers become fully productive.
Moreover, some incumbent workers must be reallocated to the job positions of the workers who
are separated from the firm. As in Henry, Karanassou, and Snower (2000), the adjustment costs
represent an extra cost paid by the firm in terms of each worker’s wage. Accordingly, we set:
ξt = φ(λAtnt−1 + vtq(θt)At)χ, (3)
where φ and χ are non negative parameters. The first term inside the parenthesis of the right
hand side equation represents the production lost when firing workers, λnt−1, while the second
term captures the disruption costs when hiring workers, vtq(θt). Given the wage and the labor
adjustment costs, the firm post the number of vacancies from the following profit maximization
problem4:
Ft = max
vt
{Atnt − wtξtnt − cvt + βEtFt+1}, s.t.(2). (4)
The first order condition is given by:
∂Ft
∂vt
= Atqt − wtξtqt − c+ βEt∂Ft+1
∂vt
= 0. (5)
Using the envelope condition we obtain the job creation condition:
At − wtξt + β(1− λ)Et c
qt+1
=
c
qt
. (6)
The presence of labor adjustment costs, ξt, reduces the net productivity, At−wtξt, and, therefore,
contracts job creation.
4For exposition reasons, we omit writing the aggregate state variables At and θt as arguments of all value
functions.
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2.2 Wages bargaining
Wages are determined through Nash bargaining between the firm and each individual worker
where they split the total surplus generated by that specific employment relationship. That
implies that the relevant surplus depends on the marginal value of a job, Jt. Therefore, the
expression for Jt is
Jt = At − wtξt + β(1− λ)EtJt+1. (7)
In turn, the values of employment, Wt and unemployment, Ut for the marginal worker are
Ut = b+ βEt{f(θt)Wt+1 + (1− f(θt))Ut+1}, (8)
Wt = wt + βEt{λUt+1 + (1− λ)Wt+1}. (9)
Thus, the Nash bargaining solution is a wage rate wt that solves
max
wt
(Wt − Ut)η(Jt)1−η, (10)
where η is the worker bargaining power. This yields the following first order condition for wages
ηJt = (1− η)ξt(Wt − Ut). (11)
Using (7) -(9) and (11) , we can now solve for the equilibrium wage as a function of the aggregate
state At and θt,
wt = η̂tAt + (1− η)b+ η̂t(1− λ)βEtθt+1c, (12)
where η̂t = ηξt is the worker bargaining power corrected by the adjustment in labor costs. It tell
us that during the wage negotiation, firms translate part of the disruption costs to the worker,
reducing their implicit bargaining power. Notice that an economy without labor adjustment costs
takes place when ξt = 1 for every aggregate state. Also notice that the higher the adjustment
cost per worker ξt the lower is the implicit worker bargaining power, η̂t, implying the possibility
of a reduction in wages when output increases after an aggregate labor productivity shock, At.
3 Empirical strategy and data description
3.1 The empirical measure of wage cyclicality
The general concept of wage cyclicality refers to the relationship between real wages and a mea-
sure of the economic cycle, such as the output gap. Traditionally, estimates based on aggregate
data rely on the unconditional, contemporaneous correlation between de-trended or growth real
manufacturing wages and the indicator of the cycle or the coefficient of an static OLS regres-
sions of real wage on the business cycle series (e.g. Otani (1978), Chirinko (1980), Sumner
and Silver (1989), etc). Alternatively, econometric studies based on dynamic specifications usu-
ally rely on structural VAR models (e.g. Abraham and Haltiwanger (1995), Fleischman (1999),
Spencer (2007), etc). Whereas these literature explicitly account for alternative causes of the
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business cycles, it imposes identifying restrictions from a theoretical framework which are usu-
ally controversial and not tested in advanced.5 Under these important restrictions, Abraham and
Haltiwanger (1995) suggest that it is possible to reconcile the overall comovement and specific
episodes of comovement in real wages and employment with different combinations of shocks
and elasticities. They also insists that correcting for all of the measurement problems estimation
problems and composition problems does not lead to a finding of systematically procyclical or
countercyclical real wages.
More recently, Messina et al. (2009) relies on both the degree of co-movement between VAR
forecast errors at different horizons and a frequency domain approach to analyse real wage be-
havior in some OECD countries. Their results suggest that country differences remain important
even after controlling for differences in data and methods. In addition, they provide evidence
that more open economies and countries with stronger unions tend to have less pro-cyclical (or
more counter-cyclical) wages.
In this paper, we also adopt a dynamic approach to give account of possible lagged effects and
persistence of the data over time. Indeed, the horizon is important since, as argued in the theo-
retical model, it is possible that due to the presence of labour adjustment cost, wages take time
to adjust to changes in business cycle conditions.
In particular, we propose a precise measure of wage cyclicality based on the generalized impulse
response function (GIRF) of growth real wages to a shock in the cycle measure -the output gap
or the growth rate of the GDP and the industrial production. An important improvement of
the GIRF is that it does not require identifying assumptions that are usually needed for VAR
decompositions.
Briefly, the idea is to obtain a media of the future shocks in a way that the response is an average
of what could happened given the present and the past. Given an actual arbitrary shock, δk, in
the k variable, the GIRF is defined as:
GIRF [n, δk,Ωt−1] = E[yt+n | εkt,Ωt−1]− E[yt+n | Ω¯t−1] (13)
Where n is the number of periods ahead, δk = (σkk)1/2 denotes one standard error shock, Ωt−1 is
all the information available in the moment of the shock (i.e. the known history of the economy
up to the moment t−1), E[·|·] is the conditional mathematical expectation taken with respect to
the VAR model and εkt are the original innovations in the VAR. In opposition to the standard
impulse response function, in the GIRF all contemporaneous and future shocks are integrated
out. Thus, the generalized impulse response function for the y vector n periods ahead is the
difference between the expected value of yt+n when the δk shock is taken into account and the
expected value without the shock. Assuming Gaussian errors, Koop, Pesaran, and Potter (1996)
5For instance, Abraham and Haltiwanger (1995) assume that labor demand disturbances shift the labor demand
schedule and generate positive comovements between real wages and employment. Labor supply disturbances, in
turn, shift the labor supply schedule and generate negative comovements between real wages and employment.
Additionally, another identifying assumption is that the demand and supply shocks are uncorrelated.
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show that the conditional expectation of the shock is equal to:
E[εt|εkt = δk] = (σ1k, σ2k, ..., σmk)′ − σ−1kk δk = Σejσjj−1δj (14)
where ek is the selected vector with the k-th element equal to one and all other elements equal
to zero and Σ = E(εtε
′
t). Then, the GIRF for a one standard deviation shock, δk = 1, to the k
variable is:
γk(n) = ψnΣekσ
−1
kk (15)
Thus, given the historic distribution in the residuals, it is important to notice that a one shock
in the k-th equation implies shocks in the other equations as well. In this way, the generalized
impulse response does not pretend to answer what would happened if there is one shock with "all
other thing remaining equal". It is rather the historical distribution of residuals (as expressed in
the variance and covariance matrix) which determines the effects of the impact of other variables.
3.2 Data description
We consider quarterly data on nominal hourly earnings in the manufacturing sector, Consumer
Price Index (CPI) deflator, Producer Price Index (PPI) deflator, real GDP, the industrial pro-
duction index and the employment rate for the USA in the 1960Q1-2011Q4 period. All the data
is provided by the OECD main economic statistics.
We computed consumer and producer real wages as hourly wages divided by the consumer price
index or the producer price index, respectively. We worked with the year-on-year growth rate of
real wages.
Given that there are a number of issues that may affect the sensitivity of the estimated cyclical-
ity, we consider different indicators for the cycle (the output gap, the annual growth rate of the
industrial production and the GDP) and real wages (consumption and production). In addition,
instead of considering the relationship between filtered series for a series of reasons regarding the
properties of filtered data, we estimate the VAR models with annualized growth rates.6
4 Real wage cyclicality in the USA
In this section we present first the graphical representation of the generalized impulse response
functions derived from our VAR models for the United States between the 1960-2011 period. We
then calibrate and simulate the model presented in section 2.
4.1 The Generalized Impulse Response Function
To investigate the cyclical character of real wages, we first analyze the response of wages to a
shock in the cycle measure (the output gap, GDP growth and industrial production growth).
6The only exception is the output gap which corresponds to the difference, in percentage points, between the
real GDP and the potential GDP computed with the HP filter.
7
Figure 1 displays the results of the generalized impulse response function together with their 5%
error bands for forty different forecasting horizon obtained from the different VAR models.7
[INSERT figure 1]
Two main comments can be drawn from these figures. First, as expected, the GIRF show that
production wages display a relatively more pronounced but less prolonged response to a shock in
the output gap. In turn, the shock last considerably longer for consumption wages. This small
difference between consumption and producer wages can be explained by the fact that, compared
to the PPI, the CPI is likely to be most influenced by the cyclical evolution of mark-ups at later
stages of the production and distribution chains (e.g. Messina (2009)). Second, the confidence
intervals are larger in the cases of the two other business cycle indicators (growth GDP and
growth industrial production index). In both cases wages seem to be anti-cyclical after about 8
periods or acyclical in the case of production wages.
Summing up, at the aggregate level and, at least in the short-run, real wages in the USA react
negatively to a shock in the business cycle. In other words, real wages display an anti-cyclic
behavior.
4.2 Calibration and simulated results
We calibrate the model presented in Section 2 at quarterly frequency in order to match several
empirical facts of the USA economy between 1985 and 2009. We set the discount factor β = 0.99,
which implies a reasonable quarterly interest rate of nearly 1 percent. Following Blanchard and
Diamond (1994), we target an average unemployment rate u∗ of 11%. This value is consistent
with the fraction of unmatched workers in the USA when consider not only the officially unem-
ployed but also those not in the labor force who want a job. Similar to Shimer (2005), we fix a
steady-state job separation probability λ equal to 0.10 per quarter and set the value of leisure
to b to match an unemployment replacement rate of 40%. The worker’s bargaining power, η, is
set to one half.
We normalize the average aggregate labor productivity A∗ to 1 and assume that log(At) follows
a first-order autoregressive process of the following form:
log(At) = ρlog(At−1) + t, (16)
where t is an i.d.d. normal distributed random variable N(0, σ). The parameters ρ and σ are
set to match the persistence and standard deviation of the output gap between 1985 and 2009.
As in Silva and Toledo (2009), we set the vacancy costs parameter c such that vacancy costs
represent 4.3 percent of wages in the steady state. With respect to the labor adjustment costs,
we evaluate the model’s results considering the presence of both linear and quadratic disruption
7We retained the Schwarz information as criterium for the lag length.
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costs. Using USA plant level data, Russell Cooper (2009) estimate that plant loses 3% of its rev-
enues during the adjustment. Thus, the parameter ξ∗ is calibrated to approximate this target in
the steady sate. Finally, the matching technology parameter ϕ, the adjustment costs parameter,
δ, the labor market tightness, θ∗, and the wage, w∗, are calibrated by solving the equations (1),
(2), (6) and (12) in the steady-state.
We simulate the model considering linear, χ = 1, and quadratic, χ = 2, labor adjustment costs as
well as the possibility that the disruption costs operate immediately or with one period lag, cap-
turing the idea that reorganizing the production process after labor adjustment takes time. Given
the wage and the labor adjustment costs. We also consider an scenario without labor adjustment
costs by fixing ξt = 1 for every aggregate state. In all these simulations we adjust the parameters
of the model in order to maintain our calibration target values. We simulate the economy for 500
periods and discard the first 385 of them in order to obtain the USA period between 1985 and
2009 (116 quarters). We generate the output gap, ygapt using an HP filter with 1600 smoothing
parameter and we log-differentiate the wage to obtain the annualized growth rate of wages, ∆wt.
Finally, we estimate a set of VAR models with these two simulated variables. Finally, we calcu-
late the generalized impulse response of wages with respect to a positive shock in the output gap.
Figure 2 shows the generalized impulse-response functions of the annualized growth rate of real
wage with respect to a positive shock of one standard deviation in the output gap.8 When there
are not labor adjustment costs (Figure 1.a), wages growth during the first three quarters. After
that quarter, the impact of the shock is negative. In contrast, under the presence of quadratic
disruption costs with no lag adjustment (Figure 2.b), the wages show an negative behavior, de-
creasing during the first three quarters. Then, ∆wt becomes positive.
[INSERT figure 2]
In Figures 1.c and 1.e, wages show an inverted hump-shaped patterns when reorganizing employ-
ment lags one period and generates quadratic and linear adjustment costs, respectively. In the
case of quadratic costs (Figure 1.c), ∆wt falls rapidly during the first three quarters and then
decreases but at a much lower rate. Instead, with the presence of linear costs, ∆wt increases in
the first quarter and then, as in the case of the presence of quadratic costs, decreases during the
next quarters.
[INSERT figure 2]
Finally, Figure 1.d shows that under the presence of linear labor disruption costs with no lag
adjustment, the response of wages is near zero. In this case, the positive effect of the increase in
the output gap is canceled out by the negative effect that operates throughout the reduction in
the implicity worker’s bargaining power, so wages are rigid under this scenario.
8Similar results are obtained with a positive shock in the annual growth rate of wages. For simplicity, we don’t
show the impulse-response functions but they are available upon request.
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[INSERT figure 2]
Summarizing, when labor disruption costs are present, firms translate part of them to the workers’
wages, reducing their implicit bargaining power and, depending on the structure of these costs,
generating a reduction in wages in response to a positive shock in the output gap. To illustrate
this behavior, Figure 3 shows the impulse response functions of the implicit bargaining power,
∆η̂t, after a positive shock in the output gap under the presence of quadratic and linear labor
disruption costs with different lag adjustments. The workers bargaining power decreases as a
consequence of the adjustment in the disruption costs, implying that these costs are partially
translated to workers throughout a reduction in real wages.
[INSERT figure 3]
A key labor market variable of the model is the relative number of vacancies to unemployment, θt,
also known as labor market tightness. Figure 4 shows the generalized impulse-response functions
of ∆θt to a positive ygapt under different scenarios of labor adjustment costs. In all of these
scenarios, labor market tightness increases during the first two or three quarters of the shock
and then decreases. However, in most of the cases, the response becomes not significant after the
four quarter. With respect to the rest of variables, and according to the response of θt, the model
generates a procyclical behavior in vacancies and employment and a countercyclical response in
unemployment during the first three or four quarters of a positive shock in ygapt .
[INSERT figure 4]
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5 Conclusions
How real wages react to business cycle conditions has been a subject of important debates for
a very long time. Indeed, theoretically, real wages are found to be counter-cyclical under sticky
wages (i.e the keynesian point of view) but procyclical under sticky prices (real business cycle
and new keynesian propositions). Furthermore, the empirical evidence is no less controversial
and inconclusive, with results depending on the wage measure adopted, the price index, the
detrending technique, the frequency of the data or even the period analyzed.
In order to contribute to this debate, we propose a model with search and matching frictions and
labor disruption costs. In addition, we estimate a generalized impulse response function derived
from a bi-variate VAR model with real wages and different measures of the business cycle for
quarterly data for the United States between 1960 and 2011.
We provide evidence that manufacturing real wages are counter-cyclic in the United States. In
effect, the impulse-response functions show that real wages fall after a positive shock in the
output gap and display an inverted hump-shaped pattern after a few quarters. Moreover, the
simulated results of our model match remarkably well the counter-cyclicality obtained from our
empirical model. According to our theoretical model, wages behave counter-cyclically because,
with a positive shock in the output gap and in the presence of labor disruption costs, firms
translate part of these costs to the workers’ wage, reducing their implicit bargaining power and,
therefore, generating a decrease in wages in response to a positive shock in the output-gap.
In addition, the calibration and simulation of the model show that different types of disruption
cost (i.e quadratic, linear, etc) tend to generate a countercyclical or even an acyclical responses
of wages. In contrast, in the absence of disruption costs wages are highly procyclic. Therefore,
our model allows to explain the different pattern found in the empirical literature. For instance,
according to our findings, the USA behaves as an economy with quadratic labor adjustment costs
with one period lag. Summing-up, we propose that, other things equal, in an economy in which
labor disruption costs are present, real wages may react in a countercyclical way in response to
an aggregate labour productivity shock.
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Figure 1: Generalized impulse response function: Consumer and producer real wages
and output gap/unemployment as cyclical indicators
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Figure 2: Generalized impulse-response functions of ∆wt to a positive ygapt shock
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Figure 3: Generalized impulse-response function of ∆η̂t to a positive ygapt shock
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Figure 4: Generalized impulse-response function of ∆θt to a positive ygapt shock
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